The Imperative of Post-Quantum Cryptography in Industrial Control Systems

By Matthew Schaefer on February 14, 2025

Executive Summary

A few years ago, the idea of quantum computers breaking encryption felt like science fiction. Now, it is a real cybersecurity crisis waiting to happen. If attackers gain access to quantum technology, they could break traditional encryption and expose critical infrastructure. The best defense is to move toward post-quantum cryptographic solutions before quantum attacks become a real-world threat. Organizations that do not start adapting now will find themselves scrambling when the quantum era arrives [1].

Background

Quantum computing is advancing rapidly, and cybersecurity professionals are paying close attention. Unlike traditional computers that process information in binary, quantum computers can solve complex problems at unprecedented speeds. This advancement is beneficial for innovation but poses a major security risk. Encryption methods like Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which have been the backbone of data protection for decades, may soon become ineffective [2]. Recognizing the urgency of this shift, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) introduced post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in 2024 to strengthen encryption against future quantum threats [1]. These new methods are crucial for protecting sensitive systems. However, many industrial networks were built years ago with encryption that is not easy to upgrade. Companies that do not start modernizing now may face serious vulnerabilities in the near future [2].

Impact

Cybercriminals have already demonstrated their sophistication. The 2024 attack on Schneider Electric’s industrial network was a wake-up call. If quantum technology falls into the wrong hands, a well-funded adversary, such as a nation-state, could infiltrate ICS networks, steal sensitive information, and disrupt essential services like energy distribution and manufacturing [3]. A growing concern is the “harvest now, decrypt later” strategy. Cybercriminals are collecting encrypted data today, knowing that within a few years, they will likely be able to decrypt it with quantum tools. Data that appears secure now may already be at risk for future exploitation.

Mitigation

Companies must evaluate their encryption systems and identify vulnerable areas [4]. This step is not theoretical but essential for preventing future breaches. NIST’s post-quantum cryptographic algorithms provide a solid foundation, but transitioning will take time. One approach is to implement hybrid encryption models that combine classical cryptography with quantum-resistant solutions. This approach strengthens security while allowing for a gradual transition to post-quantum methods. Companies should stay engaged with agencies like CISA and NIST to remain informed on best practices and industry-wide strategies [4].

Relevance

This is not just another security upgrade; it is a race against time. If ICS operators fail to adapt, they risk leaving their infrastructure vulnerable to catastrophic breaches. Organizations that act early will not only protect their systems but also set the standard for cybersecurity resilience. The exact timeline for when quantum computing will pose an immediate threat remains unclear. However, organizations that fail to prepare will be most impacted when it happens [3]. The shift to post-quantum cryptography is not merely a recommendation; it is a necessity for securing industrial systems in the digital age [4].

References

[1] National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024, August). “Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization.” NIST. https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography

[2] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2024, November). “Post-Quantum Considerations for Operational Technology.” CISA. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/post-quantum-considerations-operational-technology

[3] Oliva del Moral, J., deMarti iOlius, A., Vidal, G., Crespo, P. M., & Etxezarreta Martinez, J. (2024, January). “Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructures: A Post-Quantum Cryptography Perspective.” arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03780

[4] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2024, December). “Quantum Readiness and Migration Strategies for ICS.” CISA. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/quantum-readiness-migration-post-quantum-cryptography